We study the concrete security for succinct interactive arguments realized from probabilistic proofs and vector commitment schemes in the standard model.
We establish the tightest bound on the security of Kilian’s succinct interactive argument based on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs). Then we show tight bounds for succint interactive arguments based on public-coin interactive oracle proofs (IOPs), for which no previous analysis is known. Finally we conclude that this VC-based approach is secure when realized with any public-query IOP (a special type of private-coin IOP) that admits a random continuation sampler.
Based on https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1737.pdf, joint work with Alessandro Chiesa, Marcel Dall’Agnol, and Nick Spooner.
Ziyi Guan is a third-year PhD student at EPFL, supervised by Alessandro Chiesa and Mika Göös. She is interested in theoretical computer science, in particular complexity theory and cryptography.